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DENIAL OF DISCHARGE FOR SUBSTANTIAL
ABUSE: REFINING-NOT CHANGING-
BANKRUPTCY LAW
Carl Felsenfeld*
INTRODUCTION
9fHE Bankruptcy Code' (the "Code") provides a variety of benefits
X to individual debtors. Perhaps the key advantage conferred upon
an individual at the culmination of a bankruptcy case is the "fresh
start" that derives from the discharge of debts. The Code does not,
however, contemplate that a fresh start is appropriate under all cir-
cumstances. For example, 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) authorizes a bankruptcy
court to deny a Chapter 7 discharge to one whose debts are primarily
consumer in nature and who substantially abuses the provisions of the
Chapter.2
Since the passage of § 707(b) in 1984,3 the absence of a statutory
directive and the gloom of unclear legislative history4 have caused the
courts to express disagreement over the meaning of "substantial
abuse." Some courts have found that a debtor who would earn suffi-
cient income after the bankruptcy to pay all or a substantial portion of
his creditors was abusing the Code-this is the "excess income" test.5
Other courts have maintained that additional circumstances, such as
unconscionable spending habits or the commission of fraud, are re-
quired in addition to excess income-this is the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test.6 This Article proposes that courts ostensibly
applying the totality of the circumstances test have not, in fact, re-
quired additional circumstances to dismiss a Chapter 7 case. Despite
rhetoric to the contrary, the preponderance of cases shows that the
courts routinely apply only an excess income test. Amendments to
the Code are now being proposed to specifically provide that the ex-
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. This Article was writ-
ten with the able assistance of Genci Bilali, an Albanian attorney, prior General
Counsel of the Bank of Albania, and Fordham Law School LLM. graduate.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
2. See id § 707(b).
3. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L No.
98-353, tit. IH, §§ 312, 475, 98 Stat. 333, 355, 381.
4. "When the final version of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judge-
ship Act of 1984 was released, however, there were no official Judiciary Committee
reports. This lack of an official record creates problems in determining legislative
intent." Robert B. Vandiver, Jr., Bankruptcy-A Review of Recent Court Decisions
Applying Section 707(b) of the Banknptcy Code to Chapter 7 Proceedings, 22 Mem.
St. U. L. Rev. 549, 563 (1992) (footnote omitted).
5. See infra Part V.B.1.
6. See infra Part V.B.2.
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cess income test is sufficient. 7 This Article suggests that such amend-
ments do not actually change the Code, but rather clarify the standard
that the courts already apply to § 707(b) cases.
Part I of this Article outlines the form and function of the discharge
and corresponding fresh start in bankruptcy proceedings. Parts II and
III trace their historical development and examine their current status
in today's Code. Part IV considers the division of assets upon declara-
tion of bankruptcy and identifies the traditional policy rationales that
underlie this scheme. Part V turns to the discretionary denial of dis-
charge authorized by the Code, comparing the theories that courts
have proposed for determining whether discharge is appropriate with
their actual practices evidenced by the case law. Part VI then evalu-
ates current legislation that attempts to resolve this inconsistency in
favor of the excess income test. This Article concludes that such legis-
lation adopts the substance of the reported cases, though not their
actual language.
I. THE CONCEPT OF THE DISCHARGE AND FRESH START
A. Benefits for the Debtor
The Code contains a cornucopia of benefits for those involved in its
application. It relieves debtors (who used to be called bankrupts)8
from the pressures exerted by unpaid creditors9 and enables them to
keep certain assets free from the claims of those creditors. 10 It en-
ables creditors to receive various measures of recovery'l'perhaps
even full recovery. It protects the rights of secured creditors.' 2 It puts
certain unsecured creditors in preferred positions where assets are in-
sufficient 13 and ensures that not all creditors who had previously ad-
vanced to the head of the line in order to levy on the debtors' assets
will get the benefit of their pre-bankruptcy behavior. 4
The Code's principal benefit for the debtor is the discharge from
unpaid obligations and a corresponding fresh start. The Code sets up
several procedures (to which I will return from time to time) that pre-
scribe methods for applying a debtor's assets to his obligations and for
expunging the remainder of those obligations.' 5
7. See infra Part VI.B.
8. Aside from its title, the Code barely uses the word "bankrupt." This was part
of the consumer-related changes made in the 1978 revision. The debtor was
presented as a good guy-an idea better conveyed through the word "debtor" than
the pejorative "bankrupt."
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
10. See id. § 522.
11. See id. § 726(a).
12. See id. § 506(a).
13. See id. § 507.
14. See id. § 547.
15. The Code addresses the concept of discharge in various sections. See id.
§§ 727(a), 1141(d), 1328.
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The award of a discharge frees the debtor from the continuing en-
cumbrance of the obligation at issue.' 6 He is able to enter into a
"fresh start"-essentially a new chance to be a productive member of
society, to shake off the yoke of obligations that cannot be paid, and,
as the Constitution provides, to pursue (though perhaps never attain)
happiness. Other Code sections fortify the concept of the discharge.
For example, § 524 enjoins creditors from pursuing a discharged obli-
gation in any way.' 7 A discharge is more than an available defense to
a potential claim; it orders the discharged creditor to "get lost."'" In
addition, the Code prohibits government units from discriminating
against debtors solely because of the bankruptcy' 9 and prohibits pri-
vate employers from discriminating in areas of the employment 20
B. Consumer and Business Discharges
Both business entities and consumers2' may obtain discharges and
fresh starts under provision of the Code. Corporations and partner-
ships may not receive a discharge under the liquidation provisions of
Chapter 7 because that chapter assumes these businesses will dis-
tribute all of their assets to their creditors and, consequently, cease to
exist. Thus, a discharge is simply unnecessary for these businesses.22
Corporations and partnerships may, however, receive discharges
under the reorganization provisions of Chapter 11, because that Chap-
ter is designed to enable businesses to free themselves from unsustain-
able debts and continue a productive existence.
C. Availability to the Debtor
This section focuses upon Chapters 7, 11, and 13 of the Code.23 Dis-
charges and fresh starts are available in all three.
16. Certain obligations are not discharged. See, eg., id. § 523 (describing excep-
tions to discharge, including: tax or custom duty, fraud while acting in a fiduciary
capacity, etc.). The debtor remains subject to the terms of undischarged obligations
after the bankruptcy.
17. See id. § 524.
18. Section 524(a)(3) provides in part that a discharge is "an injunction against...
an act, to collect or recover ...." Id. § 524(a)(3).
19. See id. § 525(a).
20. See id. § 525(b).
21. Though "consumer" is not specifically defined by the Code, I will derive a
generally accepted definition from "consumer debt": "debt incurred by an individual
primarily for personal, family, or household purpose." Id. § 101(8). For purposes of
this Article, a consumer means an individual, the bulk of whose expenses are for such
a purpose. I recognize that, in a broader sense, any business is also a consumer. The
"personal, family or household" requirement provides our distinction.
22. When this provision was adopted, Congress observed that the inability of cor-
porations and partnerships to obtain a discharge in a dissolution case would "avoid
trafficking in corporate shells." H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 384 (1977).
23. Because they are not relevant to the present argument, this Article omits ref-
erence to Chapters 9 (municipalities) and 12 (family farmers).
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1. Chapter 7
Chapter 7 contemplates the liquidation of the debtor's assets. His
property owned at the time of the petition (and certain property ac-
quired later) is reduced by the exemptions given to individual debtors.
The remainder is titled the estate24 and distributed to those creditors
who existed at the time of the petition (and some others who acquired
creditor status later).,5 The remaining unpaid obligations are mostly
discharged, and the debtor is free to enjoy a fresh start, unencum-
bered by creditors and unpaid debts. Certain debts, including speci-
fied tax claims and obligations to spouses and families, remain
undischarged to reduce the pleasure of the fresh start.26 The dis-
charged debtor remains liable with respect to those obligations, and
these unpaid creditors may take any action that they could have taken
before the bankruptcy.
As previously noted, the Code presumes that corporations and part-
nerships cease to exist after they have disposed of all their assets. Dis-
charges are therefore not available to them in Chapter 7.
2. Chapter 1127
Chapter 11 provides for the reorganization of debtors who, in new
raiments, may continue their existences. Because Chapter 11 tradi-
tionally was used by commercial enterprises, there was once some
doubt as to whether it was available to consumers. The Supreme
Court resolved this question in Toibb v. Radloff.8 The Court inter-
preted the words of 11 U.S.C. § 109 according to their plain meaning,
acknowledging that "a person that may be a debtor under chapter 7
... may be a debtor under chapter 11. ' '29
Despite Toibb, however, few consumers have sought relief under
Chapter 11. The absence of consumer cases is most likely attributable
to the complexity and expense of Chapter 11, which makes it inappro-
priate for consumer debtors. The debtor3" must draft and submit a
"plan" to the court describing how the debtor will work his way out of
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 541. Because of the exclusions granted to consumers, the na-
ture of the property consumers typically bring into a bankruptcy case, and the con-
sumers' ability to plan a bankruptcy in advance to their benefit, few assets will
actually be surrendered to creditors in a consumer bankruptcy case. Richard I. Aaron,
Bankruptcy Law Fundamentals § 1.03 (1998).
25. Principally those who became creditors because the trustee exercised his
avoiding powers under 11 U.S.C. §§ 545, 547, 548, 549 and because the trustee an-
nulled executory contracts under 11 U.S.C. § 365.
26. See 11 U.S.C. § 523.
27. The benefits and detriments of Chapter 11 will appear in only minor portions
of this article, as it is rarely used by consumers. I present it here so the different forms
of discharge and fresh start available to the consumer may be understood.
28. 501 U.S. 157 (1991).
29. Id. at 160 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 109(d)).
30. The plan may be prepared by other persons, including a trustee or a creditor
under specified conditions. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121. This, however, rarely occurs.
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financial difficulties.31 The plan must be disclosed to creditors,32 who
must vote to approve the plan33 before it may be confirmed by the
court.34
Chapter 11 contemplates that the plan will create a new economic
environment in which the debtor will exist free of the problems that
brought it to bankruptcy. Generally, only a percentage of the out-
standing debts will be paid, as stated in the plan. The percentage will
usually be paid over a period of time into the future.35 Those debts
that are not paid under the terms of the plan (whether they are actu-
ally paid or not)36 are discharged. All debtors in Chapter 11-the rare
consumer, the individual proprietorship, the corporation, or the part-
nership-receive the discharge. The discharge of unpaid debts en-
ables the debtor to continue its economic existence under more
favorable conditions.
It may be said-although it is rarely accurate-that the debtor in
Chapter 11, having been discharged from its debts, enters into a fresh
start. Although the roseate future is dangled before the Chapter 11
debtor, few taste its benefits. Less than ten percent of the debtors
who elect or who are involuntarily put into Chapter 11 come out the
other end with a successfully performed plan.37 Chapter 11 is fre-
quently called a "slow Chapter 7," since so many of its debtors are
ultimately liquidated.
3. Chapter 13
Chapter 13, the principle mechanism for a consumer reorganization,
contains a discharge and fresh start that work in yet another manner.
Chapter 13 is only available to "an individual with regular income"3
whose unsecured and secured debts do not exceed limits set by the
Code. Chapter 13 is designed for individuals of modest circumstance;
its debt limits ensure that the wealthy do not resort to its simplified
provisions. Consistent with this approach, the plan drafted by the
31. See icL § 1123.
32. See id. § 1125.
33. See id. § 1126.
34. See id. § 1129.
35. Of course, it is possible that all debts will be paid under the plan in the same
manner as they existed at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed. In such a
case, relief may come to the debtor by other means: perhaps a downsizing of the
employee pool or a reorganization of markets. This, however, almost never happens;
a reduction in debts is standard and expected.
36. The discharge occurs upon confirmation of the plan. See id. § 1141(d). Be-
cause they approved the plan, the creditors are compelled to accept the debtor's dis-
charge. If they are dissatisfied with the terms of a plan, creditors must vote against it
and perhaps defeat it.
37. Ellyn Ferguson, Filing Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Doesn't Guarantee Survival,
Gannett News Service, Oct. 28, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4389682.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 109. Section 101(30) defines an individual with regular income as
an "individual whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individ-
ual to make payments under a plan under chapter 13 of this title." Id. § 101(30).
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debtor need not be formally disclosed to creditors, nor is their approv-
ing vote required. Rather, economy is the watchword.
Because creditors take no part in the approval process, their silence
may not be deemed approval of the plan. Thus, the debtor will not be
discharged until either payments under the plan are completed 39 or he
is unable to complete payment under the plan "due to circumstances
for which the debtor should not justly be held accountable."'" In the
latter event, the discharge is not as pervasive as in the former, and the
fresh start is less robust.41
Both Chapters 11 and 13 involve a plan. In Chapter 11, the plan is
usually written by the debtor; in Chapter 13, it always is. The debtor
thus has an ample opportunity to define the degree to which he will
pay his obligations and, consequently, the extent of the fresh start.
While the judge must be satisfied that the plan is proposed in good
faith,'42 nothing in the Code prescribes the extent to which obligations
must be paid. The debtor has expansive discretion to define the ex-
tent of his own discharge and his own fresh start.
In contrast, Chapter 7 is strictly defined: all of the debtor's assets
(subject to exemptions) are applied to his obligations. For a con-
sumer, all remaining obligations are discharged, subject to § 523. The
corporation and partnership simply fade away without a discharge, or
leave with whatever assets are left over.'3
II. THE SOURCE OF DISCHARGE AND FRESH START
A. Historic Treatment of Consumer Debtors
Bankruptcy laws are necessarily among our oldest commercial stat-
utes. From the time caveman Gub said to his friend Lud, "I'm a little
short of shells today, I'll pay you tomorrow," there was the chance
that Gub would not be able to produce the required shells. Over the
centuries, the law has provided various ways of handling this problem.
The Roman Twelve Tables (451-50 B.C.) arranged that a defaulting
debtor be put before the public three times in the hopes that someone
would pay his debts and avoid the dire consequences that would
otherwise follow." Failing payment, the Tables provided:
[W]hen a defendant, after thirty days have elapsed, is brought into
court a second time by the plaintiff, and does not satisfy the judg-
39. See id. § 1328(a).
40. Id. § 1328(b)(1).
41. See id. § 1328(c). Events for which a debtor should not justly be held account-
able include the loss of employment because of illness, see Thompson v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 475 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1973), and a terminated marriage and personal
surgery, see In re Dark, 87 B.R. 497 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
42. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(3), 1325(a)(3).
43. In the latter event, a business organization does not need a discharge at all,
because its obligations have been satisfied.
44. See 1 S. Scott, The Civil Law 63-64 (1932).
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ment... the plaintiff, after the debtor has been delivered up to him,
can take the latter with him and bind him or place him in fetters;
provided his chains are not of more than fifteen pounds weight; he
can, however, place him in others which are lighter if he desires to
do so .... After he has been kept in chains for sixty days .... he
shall be condemned to be reduced to slavery by him to whom he
was delivered up; or, if the latter prefers, he can be sold beyond the
Tiber .... Where a party is delivered up to several persons, on
account of a debt.., they shall be permitted to divide their debtor
into different parts, if they desire to do so; and if anyone of them
should, by the division, obtain more or less than he is entitled to, he
shall not be responsible.45
Obviously, this approach offered little sympathy to the defaulting
debtor. If he failed to pay his obligations, he was duly punished. Ro-
man law gave consideration and the related benefits only to the credi-
tor. A sense of humanity, however, probably kept creditors from
regularly enforcing the draconian penalties in the Twelve Tables.46
Over the centuries, harsh debt collection statutes-which evolved
into early bankruptcy laws47-generally took a punitive approach to-
wards the defaulting debtor. Summary remedies against property and
the debtor's person were generally available.4" Debtors' prison was
common in both England and the Colonies before the Revolution. 49
It became almost indistinguishable from the concept of indentured
servitude, a device accepted voluntarily by many impecunious En-
glishmen as a means to emigrate to the New World. ° These early
laws did not confer any benefit similar to a fresh start that might have
enabled a consumer debtor to commence a new economic life, free
from unpaid obligations.
Bankruptcy laws developed as collection devices for creditors:
[T]he bankrupt's property was to be seized by a common agent and
thereafter there was to be a distribution pro rata of the proceeds.
Holdsworth's conclusion that it was essentially an attempt to pre-
vent frauds on creditors is still valid. This theme was fundamental
to future legislation.51
45. Id.
46. At least one commentator believes that they were essentially ignored. See 2
Patrick De Colquhoun, Roman Civil Law 352 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. ed., 1988).
47. The first English bankruptcy law was enacted in 1542. See 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4
(1542) (Eng.).
48. See, e.g., Ven Countryman, A History of American Banknptcy Law, 81 Com.
L.J. 226, 227 (1976).
49. The story is told briefly in Countryman, supra note 48, at 226-28. For a more
detailed treatment, see Charles G. Hallinan, The "Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer
Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. Rich. L Rev. 49
(1986).
50. See Countryman, supra note 48, at 227-28.
51. W.J. Jones, The Foundations of English Bankruptcy: Statutes and Commis-
sions in the Early Modem Period, 69 Transactions Am. Phil. Soc'y 18 (1979) (footnote
omitted).
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To a considerable degree, modem bankruptcy laws continue to serve
that function today.
B. Early Consumer Solicitude
The sympathetic approach to consumer insolvency embedded in the
Code developed alongside increasingly liberal policies toward con-
sumer discharge and a general social concern for the plight of the
needy debtor. Despite the pro-creditor thrust of early insolvency law,
those laws were not entirely insensitive to the needs of debtors. The
Hammurabi Code, compiled during the reign of Hammurabi, King of
Babylon from 1792-1759 B.C., and said to be based upon a body of
Sumerian law in existence for centuries before,52 compelled the for-
giveness of interest in any year in which crops failed. 53 It also af-
forded debtors a continuing right to alternate forms of payment if they
were unable to repay obligations in money.54 Roman law provided an
institution known as cessio bonorum (apparently promulgated by Ju-
lius Ceasar) that enabled an insolvent debtor to have his assets valued
and surrendered to creditors in discharge of his obligations, so long as
no fraud had been committed.55
Another example of sympathetic treatment of debtors appears in a
more modem book, the Bible. The Old Testament provides a system
of relief from debts: "At the end of every seven years you must cancel
debts. This is how it is to be done: Every creditor shall cancel the
loan he has made to his fellow Israelite."56 A more expansive debt
cancellation treatment appears later in Matthew: "Forgive us our
debts, as we also have forgiven our debtors. ' '57
The first indication of solicitude towards the debtor in contempo-
rary English bankruptcy law appeared in 1705, when the Crown
promulgated several property exemptions and a discharge of obliga-
tions.5 8 The exemptions enabled the bankrupt to retain necessary
family wearing apparel apart from the bankruptcy proceedings. 9
Under this law, a debtor was also to obtain a discharge if he surren-
dered his estate and made a full disclosure of his affairs.6 ° Predictive
of current bankruptcy law, the statute also provided that the discharge
52. See 5 Encyclopaedia Britannica 669 (1994).
53. See The Code of Hammurabi King of Babylon About 2250 B.C. § 48, at 27
(Robert Francis Harper trans., 1994).
54. See id. § 51.
55. See DeColquhoun, supra note 46, at 352.
56. Deuteronomy 15:1-2 (New Int'l Version).
57. Matthew 6:12 (New Int'l Version).
58. 4 Anne 17, 11 Stat. 162 (1705) (Eng.).
59. See id., 11 Stat. at 162. The concept of exempt assets serves as one foundation
of the present institution of the fresh start-the debtor should not be required to turn
all his assets over to his creditors if he is expected to return to society.
60. See id. § II, 11 Stat. at 162-63.
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shall apply only to debts "due and owing time that he, she, or they did
become bankrupt."'"
The 1705 Act was directed primarily at the financial problems of
merchants and secondarily at those of the landed classes. At that
time, the ordinary consumer debtor did not have sufficient economic
impact to appear in a bankruptcy law. That the statute was targeted
to serve the collection interest of creditors may be derived from its
title: "An act to prevent frauds frequently committed by
bankrupts.
62
Before the Revolutionary War, a number of bankruptcy statutes ex-
isted in the American colonies. Like most early bankruptcy laws, they
focused upon creditor collection rather than debtor relief. The con-
sumer "discharge" afforded by these statutes was principally the phys-
ical discharge of a defaulting debtor from debtors' prison, which was
generally obtained by placing all of one's property in the hands of the
court, a trustee, or the creditors.63
Some statutes, however, did carry the concept of discharge from
unpaid obligations. 64 The first bankruptcy statute in the post-Revolu-
tion United States was the Bankruptcy Act of 1800.1 It was confined
to merchants and only provided for involuntary proceedings.6 Pro-
debtor provisions, albeit restricted to the merchant class, were evi-
dent.67 The statute enabled a bankrupt to exempt certain property,
including a graduated percentage allowance taken from their total as-
sets.68 It provided for releases from debtors' prison and also offered a
discharge.6 9 Though written to expire in 1805, the statute was re-
pealed in 1803.70
The expansion of debtor-related benefits continued over the years.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 included voluntary proceedings for avail-
able both merchants and non-merchants." Discharges were available
to both, although a voluntary bankrupt who had made a preferential
transfer could not obtain a discharge without the consent of a majority
of the ordinary unsecured creditors.' The Bankruptcy Act of 1867
experimented with discharges that lacked creditor consent, but ulti-
61. Id § VII, 11 Stat. at 165.
62. Id ch. 17, 11 Stat. at 162.
63. See Jeffrey L. Zackerman, Comment, Discharging Student Loans in Bank-
ruptcy: The Need for a Uniform "Undue Hardship" Test, 65 U. Cin. L Rev. 691, 694
(1997).
64. See id at 695.
65. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
66. See id § 1, 2 Stat. at 20-21.
67. See id. § 2, 2 Stat. at 21-22.
68. See id § 34, 2 Stat. at 30-31.
69. See id. § 38, 2 Stat. at 32.
70. See Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248.
71. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843).
72. See id § 2. 5 Stat. at 440.
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mately required the consent of one-fourth of the number (and thirty
percent of the amount) of claims.73
III. THE CURRENT DISCHARGE AND FRESH START
A. The 1898 and 1978 Acts
The Bankruptcy Act of 189874 evolved without interruption into to-
day's Code. It enhanced the debtor benefits that had been gradually
incorporated into prior statutes. According to the statute, bankruptcy
was either voluntary or involuntary, and discharges were granted
without creditor consent.75 Its most significant revision, the 1978
Bankruptcy Reform Act,7 6 represented the zenith of pro-debtor bank-
ruptcy law. Though modest modifications since 1978 have somewhat
reduced the debtor's position,77 United States law still confers signifi-
cant economic benefits upon the debtor in bankruptcy.
B. Changing Attitude Toward the Consumer Debtor
Consumer benefits have been expanding since the beginning of the
eighteenth century. The result of a failure to pay one's obligations
became less punitive in approach: American society renounced debt-
ors' prison for a kinder, gentler approach in which the troubled debtor
is considered "one of us." This approach reflects empathy for the
debtor, engendered by the realization that any of us could experience
financial difficulty or failure due to circumstances beyond our control
(e.g., illness, accident, job loss). One commentator has observed that
the change in attitude was "[indicative] of the entrepreneurial spirit of
the times. '78 A failure to repay an extension of credit was seen less as
a gesture of disloyalty to the state or a measure of insubordination
towards ruling classes than as one possible economic outcome that
any other borrower might also experience. The loss of a job became
less a rationale for physical harm than-consistent with the rise of un-
employment insurance-a condition for all to share. The social mar-
ketplace, perceived broadly, is like a playing field on which some win
and some lose. As in any game, we cannot predict with certainty who
will fall in what category. Inability to repay debts due to corporate
downsizing, for example, may be considered a form of "losing," but it
has clearly ceased to be a reason for punishment.
73. See Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, sec. 31, 14 Stat. 517, 532.
74. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
75. See id. §§ 4, 14, 30 Stat. at 547, 550.
76. The only other major revision was the Chandler Act of 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat.
911.
77. For example, 11 U.S.C. § 109 was amended in 1984 to provide in a new subsec-
tion (g) that a debtor could not take advantage of the benefits of bankruptcy law if his
case had been dismissed within 180 days for certain described reasons. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 109(g) (1994).
78. Zackerman, supra note 63, at 695.
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Despite current notions that we should bear responsibility for eco-
nomic problems collectively, society has never taken up the responsi-
bility of compensating the unpaid creditor for the debtor's failure to
pay. The creditor still takes the loss.7 9 On the other hand, we now
assume that the creditors will "overcharge" the financially capable,
converting unpaid debts into a cost of doing business. Thus, creditors
are not ultimately harmed by defaulting debtors; rather, the solvent
support those who will not-or cannot-pay. Ours has evolved into a
society that bears the burden of its financial delinquents. The em-
ployed pay the costs of the unemployed through their insurance pre-
miums; those in their working prime pay the cost of supporting the
elderly; those who pay their debts will cover for those who do not. It
is only where there are miscalculations, unexpected events, or an ab-
sence of planning that the allocation of losses will be laid at an unsus-
pecting door.80
Business credit serves the economy by providing a speculative basis
for future wealth. It became a basis for economic development from
the beginning of the eighteenth century. It is, however, recognized as
an economic source that may fail as well as succeed.8" The bankruptcy
laws easily take account of its potential failure and divide the conse-
quences between creditor and debtor. The creditor recovers what it
can from the assets of the debtor. The debtor is no longer removed
beyond the Tiber;8  he is rehabilitated, forgiven, and awarded a fresh
start. He is not in disgrace, but rather is still "one of us" and entitled
to try again.
C. The New Bankruptcy Laws
Today, bankruptcy laws are not designed to destroy defaulting debt-
ors. Nor are they intended to reward debtors for their mistakes at the
expense of the creditor body. Rather, both legislatures and courts cat-
egorize the bankruptcy laws as continuing attempts to balance the
needs of debtor and creditor in accordance with current social percep-
tions and requirements of the credit system. The search for the right
spot on the scale is never-ending. An overly liberal debtor approach
79. Credit insurance has a strong presence in today's society. It only exists, how-
ever, where it was created for some particular social or economic reason. It is fre-
quently offered by the creditor, who sees it both as legitimate insurance for the
debtor's benefit and as a source of income much like an interest rate. International
banks regularly offer it as an adjunct to some political purpose. This Article does not
address credit insurance, however, because it does not generally affect liability for
debts.
80. This is typified by the Southeast Asia financial crisis where improvident loans
and distorted governmental controls are only two of the factors that have led to unex-
pected credit losses on a grand scale. See David S. Sanger, After a Year, No Letup in
Asia's Economic Crisis, N.Y. Tunes, July 6, 1998, at Al.
81. For example, interest rates are scaled to account for the likelihood of failure.
82. See supra text accompanying note 45.
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threatens to destroy credit by failing to remunerate creditors and im-
posing excessive costs on borrowers who repay their debts; at the
same time, however, an unduly punitive approach threatens to impose
the same result by creating a fear of borrowing among those who
might otherwise profit from debt.
The bankruptcy laws thus represent a pendulum, constantly swing-
ing between the two extremes, never reaching either and never at rest.
Laws that increase the collection of debts benefit creditors at the ex-
pense of debtors. Relaxed responsibility upon debtors to pay their
debts has the opposite effect. Any change, stimulated by either legis-
lation or an unexpected judicial decision, pushes the pendulum.
Compared to earlier reforms,83 current proposals that would push
the pendulum between debtor and creditor tend to be relatively mod-
est. In the modern era of bankruptcy, one would not anticipate any
marked swing in favor of either debtor or creditor. Many belong to
both categories: one might be a creditor in his capacity as stockholder
of Citicorp and a debtor as a cardholder of the same entity. More-
over, debtors are not likely to suffer unduly as a result of new laws.
For some reasonable time into the future, a debtor will not be called a
bankrupt84 and he will enjoy his fresh start free of disrupting creditor
interference.85
D. Advent of Consumer Discharge and the Fresh Start
The concept of consumer discharge is deeply embedded in the
Code. The Code uses the word "discharge" in numerous places and
makes its meaning clear: a discharge applies designated assets to
creditor claims and eliminates the debts remaining. The Code does
not, however, provide specifically for the fresh start. The fresh start
represents the consumer's post-discharge ability to live free of the re-
stricting obligations that forced him into bankruptcy. It is the new
economic life given to the debtor by the discharge.
Consumer discharge and the derivative fresh start were well-en-
trenched in United States bankruptcy law by the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, which was the framework for today's Code. They have
remained firmly in place under the aegis of the Code and are in no
risk of major dislocation. The consumer entering bankruptcy through
Chapter 7 (liquidation), very occasionally Chapter 11 (reorganiza-
tion), or Chapter 13 (reorganization), along with the business that will
83. For example, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 enabled debtors to file in
bankruptcy without the necessity of proving an "act of bankruptcy." 11 U.S.C. § 301
(1994). The House and Senate Reports refer to that change as permitting voluntary
bankruptcies "without the necessity for an adjudication, as under the 1898 Act, which
was adopted when voluntary bankruptcy was a concept not throughly tested." S. Rep.
No. 95-989, at 31 (1978); accord H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 321 (1977).
84. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(13).
85. See id. §§ 524, 525.
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generally be in either Chapter 7 (liquidation) or Chapter 11 (reorgani-
zation) can reasonably assume that they will, in due course, receive
the appropriate discharge. Unless there is some particular complexity
in the proceeding, such as a fraud or an abuse of the court, the dis-
charge will be granted 6 and followed by the fresh start.
E. Measuring the Discharge and the Fresh Start
1. Evaluating the Fresh Start
From the consumer debtor's perspective,' the conditions of the dis-
charge and the fresh start turn largely on two aspects of his condition.
The first aspect is the division of the consumer's debts: the more
debts are discharged, the stronger are the discharge and the resulting
fresh start; the more debts are retained by the bankrupt consumer,'
the weaker is the discharge and the less fruitful the fresh start. The
second aspect is the division of the available assets: the more assets
are retained by the bankrupt consumer,8 9 the stronger the discharge
and fresh start; the more assets are paid over to creditors, the weaker
are those two elements.
The nature of the relationship between these two components-
debts and assets-depends upon the chapter of the Code under which
the consumer files. To a large extent, the treatment turns upon the
logic of the particular chapter (for example, there is a plan in Chapters
11 and 13 but not in 7; Chapter 13 is voluntary only but Chapters 7
and 11 may be involuntary; creditors vote in Chapter 11 but not in
Chapters 7 or 13). A number of provisions, however, seem to vary
according to the climate of the drafters' intent, and not infrequently
may be viewed as statutory accident. The following review of these
three chapters provides some examples.
a. Chapter 7
In Chapter 7, both debts and assets are largely measured at the time
the bankruptcy petition is filed, whether voluntary or involuntary."
Certain debts are discharged even if they occur after the petition, 91 as
are certain assets included if acquired after that time,92 but these tend
to be relatively minor in overall import (although they can be decid-
edly consequential to debtors and creditors in individual cases) and
will not be considered here in any detail. Most significantly, § 523
86. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
87. The principles discussed in this section are, however, equally applicable to
business bankrupts.
88. See 11 U.S.C. § 523.
89. See infra Part IV.A (discussing 11 U.S.C. § 522).
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 541.
91. See id § 502(g)-(i) (dealing with allowed claims); id. § 727(b) (defining the
obligations discharged in Chapter 7).
92. See i § 541(a)(5).
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details a series of debts that would be discharged but for that section.
The sixteen different subdivisions of subsection (a) reflect various so-
cial policies supporting a denial of discharge. The underlying ration-
ale for these exceptions is self-evident: the debtor remains liable for
certain taxes93 and family obligations;94 he is not discharged from
debts he incurred through fraud95 or from those not listed in the bank-
ruptcy;96 he is not discharged from his basic educational debts;97 nor is
he discharged from "a fine, penalty or forfeiture" owing to a govern-
mental unit.98 Any of those obligations that the Code directs not to
be discharged represents a continuing obligation to be carried by the
debtor out of the bankruptcy and sustained during the fresh start
period.
As to available assets,99 assets acquired by the debtor after the com-
mencement of a bankruptcy normally belong to him and will presuma-
bly add to the enjoyment of his post-bankruptcy life.1°° Certain
property acquired post-petition, such as particular types of property
acquired within 180 days of filing, however, is denied to the debtor
and put into the estate for allowance to creditors.101 Such assets in-
clude those received by bequest, devise, or inheritance, those received
through a property settlement or agreement with one's spouse or a
divorce decree, and those received under a life insurance or death
benefit plan.10 2
Similarly, the Code contains exemption provisions that remove
from the estate certain assets held by the debtor prior to filing, saving
them from the grasp of creditors. 0 3 These are somewhat complex in
operation and depend upon a mix of federal and state law. Assets
received by operation of these provisions further enhance the debtor's
enjoyment of his fresh start.
93. See id. § 523(a)(1).
94. See id. § 523(a)(5).
95. See id. § 523(a)(2).
96. See id. § 523(a)(3).
97. See id. § 523(a)(8).
98. Id. § 523(a)(7); see also Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986) (holding that
§ 523(a)(7) preserves from discharge in Chapter 7 any fine a state criminal court im-
poses as part of a sentence).
99. There is an unrealistic element that runs through this discussion of available
assets. Due to the poverty of the typical debtor and the generosity of state exemption
schemes, there are no assets available for distribution to creditors in over 90% of
Chapter 7 cases. See Irving A. Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankrupt-
cies: Chapter 7 Dismissal on the Basis of "Substantial Abuse," 59 Am. Bankr. L.J. 327,
335 (1985).
100. Income earned by the debtor after bankruptcy has begun is normally his and
represents a significant form of post-bankruptcy asset belonging to the debtor and not
the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6).
101. See id. § 541(a)(5).
102. See id.
103. See id. § 522. If assets are subject to a security interest, however, they remain
so subject even if exempted out of the estate. See id. § 522(c)(2).
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b. Chapters 11 and 13
Prescribing the obligations and the assets subject to Chapter 11 and
13 plans requires a different and less clear exposition. In general,
Chapter 11 discharges obligations that exist at the time the plan is
confirmed."° Chapter 13 discharges obligations provided for in the
plan," 5 so the best date for defining those obligations is also the date
of confirmation, up to which the plan may be modified.
The formal estate is of less significance in Chapters 11 and 13.106 In
Chapter 11, the debtor or trustee proposes and the creditors approve
the assets which will be committed to the consummation of the plan.
The content of the Chapter 13 estate is equivalent to that of a Chapter
7 estate, but also includes any assets acquired after the bankruptcy
begins, as described in § 541.107 The debtor remains in possession of
all property which the plan does not commit to fulfill unpaid obliga-
tions.' Unlike Chapter 7, however, "human capital" or post-petition
earnings become part of Chapter 11 and 13 estates." Creditors typi-
cally receive the bulk of their payment from those earnings.
F. Changes in the Discharge and Fresh Start
Allocation of debts and assets to the discharge and the fresh start at
one point in history does not guarantee similar allocation at another
point. Perceptions of the appropriate relationship between debtor
and creditor change over time. The actual amount of debts and assets
accumulated under the related Code provisions at different times may
themselves change, as debtor and creditor needs, expectations, and
skills (not to mention the skills of their lawyers) in manipulating the
debts and assets evolve.
Examples of both abound. For example, 11 U.S.C. § 523 was ex-
panded in 1984 to exclude more debts from discharge by creating a
presumption of fraud for certain consumer obligations incurred within
short periods before the bankruptcy.110 The scope of the discharge-
and the pleasure to be derived from the fresh start-was thereby re-
duced. A simultaneously enacted provision increased discharge for
debtors by allowing an aggregate exemption of $4000 for certain de-
scribed assets."' The fresh start was thereby sweetened through re-
moval of additional assets from the estate.
104. See id. § 1141(d)(1).
105. See id § 1328(c).
106. "[Tlhe concept of property of the estate takes on considerably less importance
in chapter 13 than in a liquidation case under chapter 7." Collier on Bankruptcy q
1306.01 (15th ed., Cum. Supp. 1996).
107. See 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a).
108. See id § 1036(b)
109. See id. § 1306(a).
110. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L No.
98-353, § 307(a), 98 Stat. 333, 353.
111. See id § 306, 98 Stat. at 353.
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There is no concept of reciprocity with respect to these changes. If
the discharge is reduced, the fresh start is not necessarily increased
equivalently. Actions dealing with either concept are taken without
necessary reflection in the other, and changes do not always result in
harmonious resolution. Any movement that believes the debtor class
is overly abused in bankruptcy-or that it is overly benefitted-may
sprout in Congress and create legislative changes to reflect that posi-
tion. Unfortunately, legislators often focus solely on short-term goals,
and lose sight of overall policies. The elimination of perceived current
abuses takes precedence over maintenance of a well-balanced Code.
IV. DIVISION OF THE ASSETS
A. Chapter 7 and the Exclusion of Future Income
The Code contains a less than rigorous scheme for determining
whether the debtor's assets will be paid to creditors in reduction of
their obligations or awarded to the debtor for enjoyment in the fresh
start. For the consumer debtor, I will examine this pattern as it shapes
Chapter 7 (dissolution) and Chapter 13 (reorganization).' 2
The structure of Chapter 7 is relatively crisp. First, the appropriate
assets comprise the estate.113 Assets in the estate are paid to un-
secured creditors." 4 An asset deemed not to be part of the estate, or
removed from the estate by operation of a debtor's exemption," l5 will
not be applied to unsecured obligations," 6 but rather belongs to the
debtor and may be utilized by him in the fresh start.
A modified estate also serves as a basis for aspects of Chapter 13,117
but the Code is less dogmatic in prescribing the assets surrendered to
unsecured creditors. Those are fundamentally determined by the
debtor in his plan and are subject to wide permissible variations. The
estate in Chapter 13 thus affects creditors' benefits less directly. The
estate may, for example, define those assets that fall within a com-
mand of the Code or the plan that estate assets be handled in a partic-
ular way."18 It may define those assets that are subject to the
automatic stay and therefore are protected for creditors." 9 It
112. As previously noted, Chapter 11 is not a significant part of consumer bank-
ruptcy procedure. See supra Part I.C.2.
113. See 11 U.S.C. § 541.
114. See id. § 126(a)(2).
115. See id. § 522.
116. Secured assets are another story and will not be addressed here. Section 506
prescribes the secured creditor's ownership interest: If assets subject to a valid lien
are exempted by the debtor, the lien remains and may be enforced by the secured
creditor. See id. § 522(c)(2).
117. See id. § 1306.
118. See In re Calder, 973 F.2d 862, 866-68 (10th Cir. 1992).
119. See In re Ziegler, 136 B.R. 497, 500 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1992).
[Vol. 671384
DENIAL OF DISCHARGE
prescribes property that vests in the debtor upon confirmation of the
plan.120
In Chapter 7, the definition of the estate measures those assets that
are paid to creditors in reduction of their claims. It establishes a basic
measure of the extent to which those claims are reduced and conse-
quently determines the scope of the discharge and the extent to which
obligations will not be satisfied. The discharge may be large or small,
depending upon the quantity of obligations present in the bankruptcy
and the quantity of assets applied to those obligations. The fresh start,
however, always represents a debtor no longer encumbered by obliga-
tions. He comes out of bankruptcy free of unpaid debts 21 with assets
of various qualities accorded to him by bankruptcy law. Among those
assets are most assets acquired after the bankruptcy case has begun, t22
including income earned from "services performed by an individual
debtor after the commencement of the case."'1
It is by no means clear that such income should, as a matter of good
social policy, be excluded from the estate and withheld from creditors.
Obligations are generally incurred upon the expectation that they will
be paid from future income. 124 This approach to consumer credit be-
comes even more significant as consumer obligations shift from the
more traditional "asset-based" debts-such as automobile loans or
furniture financing-to the modern unsecured credit card obligations,
which are granted based upon expectation of future earnings and with
little regard to one's accumulated assets. Middle- and lower-class
families, who have little in the way of accumulated assets, now partici-
pate in the store of national wealth through the economic use of fi-
ture income. Diminishing the value of that income may have an
unfortunate effect upon such consumers. The current Code goes too
far in eliminating future income as a source of payment.
120. See 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b); In re Petruccelli, 113 B.R. 5, 15-16 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1990).
121. Subject, of course, to those debts that are not discharged pursuant to § 523.
The bankruptcy court has little discretion with respect to an award of Chapter 7 dis-
charge. Section 727(a) provides that "[t]he court shall grant the debtor a discharge."
11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (emphasis added).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) prescribes that the estate consists of "all legal or equita-
ble interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." Id.
§ 541(a)(1) (emphasis added).
123. Id. § 541(a)(6).
124. Mortgages are taken to provide for the situation where income proves to be
insufficient. Most creditors, operating on a thin level of profit established by competi-
tion among fellow creditors, assume that they will lose money wherever they must
resort to enforcement of a mortgage. Andrew F. Brimmner reflected the creditor posi-
tion when he testified: "The typical lender expects to get repaid from the income
generated by a borrower who continues to work and pay his debts. The typical lender
does not extend credit on the assumption that it will be repaid out of liquidation of
assets." Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomnm. on Courts of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 10 (1981) (statement of Andrew M.
Brimmer, President of Brimmer & Co.).
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How different is future income from "[p]roceeds . . .of or from
property of the estate" which is included in the estate and paid to
creditors? If a debtor owns a dancing bear at the time of the bank-
ruptcy, profits derived from the bear's services will be in the estate; if
the debtor is a performer himself, profits from his own efforts-
termed "human capital" at the time of the bankruptcy-will be ex-
cluded. A medical, law, or engineering license-perhaps the best evi-
dence of human capital and the promise of future earnings-is not
considered the equivalent of the bear; income as a doctor, lawyer, or
engineer earned after the petition in bankruptcy will not be part of the
estate.
A rationale for the exclusion appears in the landmark case of Local
Loan Co. v. Hunt."z According to Justice Sutherland, one whose
wages are committed in advance to creditors will simply not work:
When a person assigns future wages, he, in effect pledges his future
earning power. The power of the individual to earn a living for him-
self and those dependent upon him is in the nature of a personal
liberty quite as much as, if not more than, it is a property right. To
preserve its free exercise is of the utmost importance, not only be-
cause it is a fundamental private necessity, but because it is a matter
of great public concern. From the viewpoint of the wage earner
there is little difference between not earning at all and earning
wholly for a creditor. Pauperism may be the necessary result of
either. The amount of the indebtedness, or the proportion of wages
assigned, may here be small, but the principle, once established, will
equally apply where both are very great. The new opportunity in
life and the clear field for future effort, which it is the purpose of the
bankruptcy act to afford the emancipated debtor, would be of little
value to the wage earner if he were obliged to face the necessity of
devoting the whole or a considerable portion of his earnings for an
indefinite time in the future to the payment of indebtedness in-
curred prior to his bankruptcy.1 26
Is this rationale convincing? Absent bankruptcy, does the prospect
that all or a substantial part of one's income will be assigned to the
payment of previously contracted debts result in a refusal to work? If
it did, few would work-or live in their own homes, or drive in their
own cars-in today's credit economy. Professor Thomas H. Jackson
has concluded as much in the 1985 Harvard Law Review: "The ac-
commodation currently embodied in the Bankruptcy Code is by no
means ineluctable.... Nor is there an obvious reason why bankruptcy
law has itself chosen to protect human capital yet has largely dele-
gated the choice of exemptions to state law.' 1 27
125. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
126. Id. at 245.
127. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 Harv. L.
Rev. 1393, 1431 (1985) (footnotes omitted). Professor Jackson refers to two bills, one
introduced in the Senate and the other in the House in 1982, that required future
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Underlying the Code's distinction is the classic difference between
tangible assets at one extreme-houses, automobiles, plant, and
equipment-and the intangible human capital at the other. The possi-
bility that an individual will work may not have been deemed suffi-
ciently firm to be considered the equivalent of tangible wealth to be
paid to creditors in reduction of their claims. Since Professor Jackson
wrote his article, however, the burgeoning field of intellectual prop-
erty has grown rapidly; its subject matter, largely intangible in nature,
has become one of our dominant and accepted forms of wealth. One
would marvel at the idea of Bill Gates, Chairman of Microsoft Corpo-
ration and possibly the world's richest man, walking through customs
and saying "I have nothing to declare." The time may have arrived
for the Code to recognize these new forms of wealth.
B. Chapter 13 and the Inclusion of Future Income
The Chapter 13 estate has differed from the Chapter 7 estate since
1978. Though excluded from the Chapter 7 estate, "earnings from
services performed by the debtor after the commencement of the
case" are included in the Chapter 13 estate. 2
Chapter 13 has always assumed that future income will be taken
into account in connection with a consumer bankruptcy. Section 74,
the original form of present Chapter 13, was added to the Act in 1933
and imposed few limitations upon its arrangement provisions.1 29 It
authorized that, "Any person excepting a corporation may file a peti-
tion.., stating that he is insolvent or unable to meet his debts as they
mature, and that he desires to effect a composition or an extension of
time to pay his debts.
130
A more formal Chapter 13 Wage Earner Plan was added to the
Bankruptcy Act with the Chandler Act of 1938.3 It was founded on
the premise that such a plan would be funded solely by future income,
and that only future income would be considered in the creation
thereof. Accordingly, "[a] plan under this chapter... (4) shall include
provisions for the submission of future earnings or wages of the
debtor to the supervision and control of the court for the purpose of
enforcing the plan.,
132
Thinking had evolved by adoption of the Code in 1978. The Report
of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States
133
observed that "[p]resent Chapter XIII contemplates that a plan
earning potential to be considered in determining whether one qualified for straight
bankruptcy. See id. at 1431 n.125.
128. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(2).
129. See Act of March 3, 1933, Pub. L. No. 72-420, ch. 420, 47 Stat. 1467.
130. Id. § 74(a), 47 Stat. 1467.
131. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, art. VIII, § 646, 52 Stat. 840, 934.
132. Id.
133. H.R. Rep. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 175 (1973).
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should provide for the payment of debts only out of 'future earnings
or wages."" 34 It proceeded to propose an estate for Chapter 13 com-
prised of the same assets as those assigned to the Chapter 7 estate,
continuing the inclusion of future income.'
Though inconsistent with the Code's general policy of excluding
human capital from resources available to pay creditors, its inclusion
in Chapter 13 had several justifications. First, Chapter 13 bankruptcy
is always voluntary. Thus, if the debtor consents to subject his future
income to operation of the estate, there would seem to be no bar
against it. Second, the estate in Chapter 13 does not prescribe those
assets payable to creditors.' 36 It does not, therefore, present the dis-
couragement from work claimed by Justice Sutherland in Local
Loan.'37 The effect of including future income in the Chapter 13 es-
tate is consequently diluted.
V. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL OF CONSUMER DISCHARGE
Chapters 7 and 13 of the Code contain various reasons why a dis-
charge might not be granted to a consumer debtor. In Chapter 7
cases, § 727 provides ten specific reasons (some of them sub-divided)
why a discharge will not be granted. 38 Preclusion of discharge de-
pends solely upon demonstrating the existence of one of those ele-
ments. Chapter 13 requires the court to confirm a plan 39 before a
plan may be completed-the prerequisite to a discharge.' 40 Absent
one of the statutory requirements for confirmation, there can be no
discharge.
The appropriateness of a denial of discharge can be determined for
a large debtor group if the precluding factor is clear and distinct. The
presence of such a factor can be identified from information submit-
ted by the debtor or elicited from him through one of the investigative
devices authorized by the Code.141 Where the applicable test requires
the exercise of judicial discretion based upon the specific facts of a
case, however, the existence of a vast quantity of debtors poses a prac-
tical problem for an overworked judiciary.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. See supra Part I.C.3.
137. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
138. Discharge will not be granted where the debtor is not an individual, where the
debtor has fraudulently conveyed, concealed, or misrepresented his assets, where
other code provisions prohibit discharge, or where the court approves a written
waiver of discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1994).
139. See id. § 1325.
140. See id. § 1328. Discharges may also be granted after partial payment. See id.
§ 1328(b).
141. See, e.g., id. § 343 (requiring the debtor to submit to an examination under
oath); id. § 521 (listing debtor's duties, including filing a list of creditors, a schedules
of assets and liabilities, current income and current expenditures, and a statement of
the debtor's financial affairs).
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For example, confirmation of a plan under Chapters 11 and 13 re-
quires that "the plan has been proposed in good faith." 4 ' "Good
faith as the sine qua non for the filing and maintenance of a Chapter
11 case should be probed elastically and on a case by case basis.' '14 3
Such a subjective test may be a sound approach, consistent with the
Code, and may constitute an effective control over Chapter 11 where
the numbers are relatively limited'" and where creditors exert their
own controls over the administration of the cases. It cannot, however,
effectively adjudicate the excess of bankruptcy cases that now plagues
our judicial system.
Administration of such a case-by-case analysis is particularly im-
practical in Chapter 7 cases, which currently number about a million a
year.145 Challenges to Chapter 7's analogous "good faith" provision
have given rise to administrative difficulties. Section 707(b) provides:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a
motion by the United States trustee, but not at the request or sug-
gestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an indi-
vidual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily
consumer debts if it finds that the granting of relief would be a sub-
stantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter.1 46
All aspects of this sentence have presented problems for the
courts.147 The most difficult of these is the meaning of the words
"substantial abuse." The statute itself contains nothing of help, and
the legislative history is at best confusing. When preceding § 707(a)
was enacted as part of the newly-created Code in 1978, the Congres-
sional Report stated:
142. See id. §§ 1129(a)(3), 1325(a)(3). This requirement may fairly be viewed as
surplusage. The entire Code is equitable in nature and it is fair to observe that all acts
must be taken in good faith. That a plan must be proposed in good faith cannot be
taken as an indication of congressional intent that the remainder of the Code need not
be performed in good faith. See Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 106, '1
1129.03(3)(a)(ii).
143. In re Eden Associates, 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1249, 1256 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1981).
144. In 1996, Chapter 11 cases were approximately three percent of the Chapter 13
cases and under two percent of the Chapter 7 cases. See U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States 549 (117th ed. 1997).
145. Consumer bankruptcies-Chapters 7 and 13-reached an all-time high of 1.3
million in 1977 and, according to Visa U.S.A., will increase 69% or to 2.2 million by
2001. See Jaret Seiberg, isa Projecting a 69% Jump in Banknptcy Filings by 2001,
Am. Banker, July 14, 1998, at 2.
146. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).
147. For example, what is the result if a request is made by a party in interest? See
In re Clark, 927 F.2d 793, 795 (4th Cir. 1991) (reversing lower court's decision that
interpreted § 707(b) as barring a trustee from instituting motion at suggestion of cred-
itor who is a party in interest). What is meant by "primarily" consumer debts? See In
re Scheinberg, 132 B.R 443, 444 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1991) (acknowledging disagreement
over the quantum of proof required to support dismissal under § 707(b)).
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This section [707(a)] authorizes the court to dismiss a liquidation
case only for cause, such as unreasonable delay by the debtor that is
prejudicial to creditors or nonpayment of any fees and charges re-
quired under chapter 123 of title 28. These causes are not exhaus-
tive, but merely illustrative. The section does not contemplate,
however, that the ability of the debtor to repay his debts in whole or
in part constitutes adequate cause for dismissal. To permit dismissal
on that ground would be to enact a non-uniform mandatory chapter
13, in lieu of the remedy of bankruptcy.' 48
Some six years later, a contrasting statement was written in the con-
sideration of subsequently enacted § 707(b): "[I]f a debtor can meet
his debts without difficulty as they come due, use of Chapter 7 would
represent a substantial abuse.' '1 49
Though a future income test was included in an initial draft of
§ 707(b), it was dropped before the provision's enactment. 150 In some
early cases, courts refused to consider future income at all in deciding
whether the bankrupt committed a substantial abuse of the Code, be-
cause of the legislature's deliberate omission of that test.151 Subse-
quent decisions, however, quickly established that future income
should be considered in determining whether a Chapter 7 case should
be dismissed for substantial abuse of the Code.'52 Disagreement over
the degree to which one's future earnings should influence a determi-
nation of "substantial abuse" then developed.
Brian Wildermuth's representative article on the subject 53 purports
to summarize three separate positions that have been taken on the
role of future earnings in abuse determinations: (1) a debtor's ability
to pay a substantial portion of his debts constitutes substantial abuse
of Chapter 7; (2) a debtor's ability to pay is only one factor which
must be accompanied by other ingredients to find substantial abuse;154
or (3) a debtor's ability to pay justifies dismissal only if it is accompa-
nied by some "egregious circumstance," "unfair advantage," or evi-
dence of bad faith.155
148. S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 94 (1978).
149. S. Rep. No. 98-65, at 54 (1983).
150. See David L. Balser, Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code: A Roadmap with
a Proposed Standard for Defining SubstantialAbuse, 19 Mich. J.L. Reform 1011, 1018-
19 (1986).
151. See In re Antal, 85 B.R. 838 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988). Having accepted the
precedent of its district court that future income may not be considered in measuring
abuse, the bankruptcy court concluded, "707(b) ... is now a dead letter." Id. at 841.
152. See In re Bell, 56 B.R. 637, 641 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986); In re Grant, 51 B.R.
385 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); In re Edwards, 50 B.R. 933, 937 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985).
153. See Brian Wildermuth, In re Lee: Tithing as Grounds for Dismissing Under
Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 26 U. Tol. L. Rev. 725, 729-30 (1995).
154. This "totality of the circumstances" has been called the "prevailing view."
Consumer Bankruptcy Reform on the Hill, Bank. L. Letter, May 1998, at 4.
155. Wildermuth, supra note 153, at 730. This position is said to be held by only a
small group of courts. See id.
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This Article contends that the courts have not, in fact, adopted
these three approaches but rather adhere to only one-the first.
Though they sometimes pay lip service to the other two, the courts
have failed to apply either in a manner which would justify calling
them "positions."' 56 Wildermuth conspicuously fails to identify a sin-
gle case supporting the third approach. Proposed amendments to
§ 707(b) that would codify the first position do not change bankruptcy
law but, rather, clarify the policy already applied by the courts.
A. Statutory Development of Discharge Denials
The provisions of the Code discussed above are composed of many
elements, large and small. I have referred to provisions that represent
a debt that may or may not be discharged or an asset that may or may
not be included in the estate. Other provisions, to which I now turn,
are broader and bolder in approach; they may prohibit a discharge
and a subsequent fresh start entirely. In somewhat different forms,
these denials reside throughout the Code. For example, § 305 an-
nounces the judicial power to "dismiss a case ... if... the interests of
creditors and the debtor would be better served by such dismissal." 15
The power to dismiss a case also resides in particular provisions of
Chapter 7,158 Chapter 11,119 and Chapter 13.1 0 Confirmation of a
plan may be rejected under either Chapter 11 or 13.161 Failure of the
plan results in the absence of a discharge and, consequently, the fail-
ure to achieve a fresh start.
Sections 727 and 523 stand in neat distinction to one another. Sec-
tion 727(a) lists ten factors that will cause the debtor not to obtain a
discharge in Chapter 7. Section 523, on the other hand, assumes the
grant of a discharge and isolates a series of well-defined obligations
that will not be discharged themselves. Presumably, the situations
barring discharge are entirely more serious than those in which only
certain obligations are retained. This presumption is not, however,
entirely clear-or perhaps the relative seriousness of these situations
is in the eyes of the beholder (or legislator). For example, if a debtor
transfers property within a year of the bankruptcy with intent to hin-
der a creditor, the discharge is entirely denied; if he commits larceny,
only that single obligation is barred from discharge.
156. One commentator has come close to this position: "Of the four factors consid-
ered by courts that reject the ability to repay standard, it can be argued that each
factor is simply a restatement of the same general inquiry-the ability of the debtor to
use future income to repay the debts under a chapter 13 repayment plan." Vandiver,
supra note 4, at 559 (citation omitted).
157. 11 U.S.C. § 305(a) (1994).
158. See id § 707.
159. See id § 1112.
160. See id § 1307.
161. See iU §§ 1129, 1325.
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Changing perceptions of the same element may cause that element
to be moved from one function to another over time. The evolution
of § 523 and the exceptions to discharge provide one such example.
Subdivision (2) provides that a debt obtained by a false statement in
writing 162 may not be discharged. In its original form, the section pro-
vided that such a false statement prevented the full discharge:
The judge shall hear the application for a discharge . . . and dis-
charge the applicant unless he has... (3) obtained money or prop-
erty on credit upon a materially false statement in writing, made by
him to any person or his representative for the purpose of obtaining
credit from such person.16
This language became part of section 14 (the predecessor to § 727
of the present Code) until 1960, when it was moved to section 17
(which served as the model for § 523 and defined specific debts that
were not subject to a discharge). 164 The Senate Report accompanying
the 1960 amendment stated:
The committee believes that complete denial of a discharge is too
severe a penalty in the case of the individual noncommercial bank-
rupt. It is also a penalty which experience has shown to be subject
to abuse. An unscrupulous lender armed with a false financial
statement has a powerful weapon with which to intimidate a debtor
into entering into an agreement in which the creditor agrees not to
oppose the discharge in return for the debtor's agreement to pay the
debt in full after discharge.'
65
B. The Representative Cases
Roughly 350 cases have been brought in the federal courts-includ-
ing the Bankruptcy Court-dealing in some way with § 707(b) since
its enactment in 1984.166 Some 139 of these cases have dealt with the
question of whether or not a Chapter 7 case should be dismissed be-
cause the debts were primarily consumer in nature and there was sub-
stantial abuse of the provisions of the Code.1 67 Of those cases, 107
have found that the Chapter 7 case should be dismissed because the
debtor has human capital, or future income, in excess of his needs that
could be used to pay all or a substantial portion of his obligations
within a reasonable time. 168 A review of other circumstances may or
162. See § 523(a)(2)(B).
163. Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-294, ch. 412, § 6, 36 Stat. 838, 839.
164. Act of June 12, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-621, 74 Stat. 408.
165. S. Rep. No. 86-1688, at 2955 (1960).
166. Search of Westlaw, FBKR-CS database (Sept. 15, 1998).
167. The remaining cases relate to § 707(b) in some way that is at best tangential to
the matters discussed in this article-§ 707(b) may be mentioned in connection with a
review of the statutory history of § 707(a), or the case may deal with a denial of dis-
charge under § 727 or an exemption under § 522. A list of these cases is on file with
the Fordham Law Review.
168. A list of these cases is on file with the Fordham Law Review.
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may not be a part of the analysis. An additional six cases find that,
although there was insufficient income to pay creditors, the Chapter 7
case should be dismissed because the debtor abused the Code in other
ways. 69 Only seven cases find that, although there was enough sur-
plus income to make a meaningful payment to creditors, the Chapter
7 case should not be dismissed because a review of the "totality of the
circumstances" (or some analogous test) failed to uncover some equi-
table abuse of the Code.' 70
1. The Excess Income Test171
The great bulk of the cases find that the debtor has income in excess
of his reported needs and, therefore, can allocate portions of his fu-
ture income to the repayment of creditors whose obligations would
otherwise be discharged. In other words, they find that a fresh start is
inconsistent with the purposes of the Code when the debtor will re-
ceive income that could be used to pay his creditors at the time of
bankruptcy without reducing his style of living. In re Struggs'2 sum-
marizes the position that future income sufficient to pay obligations
suffices to demonstrate an abuse of Chapter 7: "[T]he Court finds
that the debtor can pay a meaningful part, in fact all, of his unsecured
debt in a Chapter 13 plan, and that therefore granting him relief under
Chapter 7 would be a substantial abuse of the Bankruptcy Code."'173
2. The Totality of the Circumstances Test
Some other courts, however, seem to require more than the excess
income test: in addition to surplus income, the "totality of the circum-
stances" must demonstrate some element of unfairness if the debtor
were to receive a fresh start.174 The cases present this test in various
169. See In re Gavita, 177 B.R. 43, 47 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994); In re Ragan, 171
B.R. 592, 596 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994); In re Veenhuis, 143 B.R. 887, 889 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1992); In re Palmer, 117 B.R. 443,448 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990); In re Jones, 114
B.R. 917, 924 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990); In re Bruno, 68 B.R. 101, 103 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1986).
170. See Green v. Staples, 934 F.2d 568, 573 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Higuera, 199 B.R.
196, 201 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996); In re Butts, 148 B.R. 878, 880 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1992); In re Fortune, 130 B.R. 525, 526 (Bankr. C.D. Il. 1991); In re Hammer, 124
B.R. 287,289 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1991); In re Keniston, 85 B.R. 202,223 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1988); In re Deaton 65 B.R. 663, 664 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986).
Five other cases also relate to situations where the Chapter 7 case is retained, but
do not fail to support the totality of the circumstances test for other reasons. See infra
note 183. The remaining 16 cases retain Chapter 7 because of some ingredient not
directly relevant to the subject matter of this Article-for example, the obligations
were not substantially consumer in nature.
171. This standard can also be called the "ability to pay" test.
172. 71 B.R. 96 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987).
173. Id. at 99.
174. Items two and three in the three classifications given above are taken from the
Wildermuth article. See WNddermuth, supra note 153, at 729-30.
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ways. Some give themselves room for a wider evaluation, but do not
require it:
Although, the ability to repay one's obligations is a major consider-
ation in a section 707(b) inquiry, it is not the only one. Where nec-
essary, the court may consider such things as:
a. the circumstances which motivated the petition, in terms of
whether the debtor has suffered an unforseen calamity, or is merely
using chapter 7 provisions to gain relief from past excesses.
b. whether the debtor has fully and accurately disclosed his
monthly income and whether the proposed budged [sic] is excessive
or extravagant.
c. whether or not the information the debtor has supplied, in con-
nection with the bankruptcy schedules and statements, accurately
reflects the debtor's true financial condition, and, if not, whether
this amounts to an attempt to mislead the court.
This list is not exhaustive.1 75
Courts frequently give lip service to the totality of the circum-
stances test(s) but fail to apply it in any meaningful sense. For exam-
ple, the North Dakota Bankruptcy Court began its evaluation of In re
Kress by stating:
[T]he most important criteria in determining whether a particular
filing constitutes "substantial abuse" is the debtors [sic] ability to
make repayment, but this is not the only criteria. More appropri-
ately, a bankruptcy court, when considering whether substantial
abuse exists in a given case, ought to consider the totality of the
circumstances, bearing in mind that the basic purpose of Chapter 7
is to provide the honest debtor with a fresh start. 176
Following that introduction, however, the court considered only the
factor of disposable income and whether it could cover creditor
claims. 1
77
A variation of the foregoing approach conflates the totality of the
circumstances test with the excess income test but achieves the same
result. For example, a Georgia bankruptcy court has held that denial
is appropriate wherever "[a]n evaluation of the totality of circum-
stances shows Debtors have an ability to pay a substantial portion of
their unsecured debt within a reasonable time. ' 178 In other words,
175. In re Ploegert, 93 B.R. 641, 642 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Gomes v. United States Trustee, 220 B.R. 84, 87
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he debtor's ability to pay his debts when due, as deter-
mined by his ability to fund a chapter 13 plan, is the primary factor to be considered
in determining whether granting relief would be substantial abuse." (quoting In re
Kelley, 841 F.2d 908, 914 (9th Cir. 1988))).
176. In re Kress, 57 B.R. 874, 878 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985).
177. See id.
178. in re Lee, 162 B.R. 31, 43 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993).
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"[d]ebtor's honestyi 79 is measured by an ability to repay debts out of
future earnings."' 0
Another incarnation of the totality of the circumstances test exam-
ines the surrounding circumstances, not to determine whether there
are reasons to support dismissal of the Chapter 7 case, but rather to
determine whether any extenuating circumstances that indicate that it
should not be dismissed. This approach is exemplified in In re Bus-
bin.'8' After looking to various factors to see whether a Chapter 7
dismissal should not be granted and describing the outstanding debts,
the Court stated that:
[I]t does not appear that Debtor is inflicted with "crushing debt bur-
dens and severe financial problems" or even with debts he cannot
pay. It is apparent Debtor filed his Chapter 7 petition for the sole
purpose of discharging a single debt which he does not wish to pay.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED [that the Chapter 7 case be
dismissed]. i2
The true application of a totality of the circumstances test can be
confirmed only by a case in which a court finds that surplus income
does in fact exist, but nevertheless refuses to dismiss the Chapter 7
case because there are no other supportive circumstances. Only this
situation can verify that the court is really considering the totality of
the circumstances, and not just the presence of surplus income. There,
the significance of the other circumstances is holding, not dicta.
Only seven such cases exist in the scores of § 707(b) opinions.1 3
Six of those cases, however, are in bankruptcy court (which is not a
Constitutional Article III court) and thus can hardly be the basis of a
judicial doctrine interpreting the will of Congress.
179. Honesty is another of the traditional circumstances.
180. In re Sanseverino, 171 B.R. 46, 48 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994).
181. 95 B.R. 240 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989).
182. Id at 246.
183. See supra note 170. Of these six, two were decided by the same judge in the
same year, and consequently do not really serve to broaden the doctrine. See In re
Fortune, 130 B.R. 525 (Bankr. C.D. II. 1991); In re Hammer, 124 B.R. 287 (Bankr.
C.D. Ill. 1991).
Five additional cases deny the presence of substantial abuse and retain the Chapter
7 case, but do not actually support the totality of the circumstances doctrine. See In re
Williams, 155 B.R. 773 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993) (retaining Chapter 7 where surplus
income existed but was insufficient to fund a Chapter 11 or 13 case); In re Hampton,
147 B.R. 130 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1992) (retaining Chapter 7 case involving only a mod-
est amount of surplus income that could pay only five percent of the unsecured credit
over a period of 36 months); In re Harris, 125 B.R. 254 (D.S.D. 1991) (denying Chap-
ter 7 dismissal because of the totality test); In re Martin, 107 B.R. 247, 249 (Bankr. D.
Ala. 1989) (retaining Chapter 7 case in which only a limited amount of surplus income
existed and noting that debtors "should not be pushed to the edge of financial survival
because a plan looks feasible on a cold financial statement"); In re Tefertiller, 104
B.R. 513 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (retaining the Chapter 7 case after difficulty in de-
termining whether surplus income actually existed and failing to articulate any spe-
cific totality of the circumstances test).
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In re Green,"' however, is a court of appeals case extensively cited
for the proposition that dismissal under § 707(b) must be supported
by the totality of the circumstances, and not by excess income alone.
In Green, the debtor's most recent annual income of $46,000 resulted
in a surplus of $638 a month that could be applied in reduction of his
pre-petition obligations. 18 5 The trustee so argued, but the court re-
jected that position in favor of the alternative approach, that a Chap-
ter 7 dismissal must be based upon a totality of the circumstances. 18 6
As the court noted, however, the debtor anticipated that his next
year's income would be only $26,000, leaving him nothing to apply to
his debts.' 87 A lawyer arguing the case would have realized that the
$638 monthly surplus was merely a theoretical number, and that, in
fact, there was no surplus income available for payment of debts. The
case for dismissal was thus lost from the outset. The court's discussion
of a totality of the circumstances test was not essential to the holding,
and was therefore dicta.' 88 Thus, the single most important affirma-
tion of the test is, in reality, just legal conversation.
3. Synthesis
These cases, along with the many others dealing with the § 707(b)
issue of substantial abuse, do not fall into the neat three-class system
expressed in the Wildermuth article.' 89 Rather, they reveal a spec-
trum of views-none of which constitute a discrete doctrine. These
cases do, however, share a common element: the presence of suffi-
cient future income to pay all or a substantial portion of the outstand-
ing obligations as of the bankruptcy. Such income is universally held
to be either the sole measure of substantial abuse or the dominant
ingredient thereof. 90 Surplus future income is essential; something
more may or may not be required, and what is required is, at best,
uncertain. In those many cases where the other circumstances are
184. 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1991).
185. See id. at 569.
186. See id. at 572.
187. See id. at 569.
188. One commentator has summarized dicta as follows:
"Where a decision rests on two or more grounds, none can be relegated to
the category of obiter dictum." This is the traditional view when there are
alternative grounds for a decision. But suppose ... that the court relies far
more heavily on one of the two grounds .... Many courts have said that
"opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination
of the court, and [are] made without argument, or full consideration.... " are
dicta.
Comment, Dictum Revisited, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 509, 511 (1952) (quoting Woods v. Inter-
state Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 37 (1949), and State v. Tingle, 60 So. 728, 729 (Miss.
1913)). Since dicta is not essential to the decision, the courts may not have fully con-
sidered the issues involved. See Toni M. Fine, American Legal Systems: A Resource
and Reference Guide 39 (1997).
189. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
190. See supra Parts V.A, V.B.
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practically disregarded, the totality of the circumstances test is cer-
tainly a misnomer, and probably no more than dicta. If it is merely
dicta, the test need not be followed by subsequent courts. Though
some cases do appear to take the test more seriously, it is difficult to
draw the line beyond which the test matters and short of which it does
not.
A small group of six cases also hold that surplus income is not nec-
essary if bad faith or abuse of the Code can be separately demon-
strated.19' This alternate standard is perfectly appropriate as a
separate test of substantial abuse and should be retained in whatever
statutory amendment that is adopted. But the addition of other tests
to the surplus income test as a dual standard has not, I believe, been
adopted by the courts in any meaningful way-nor should it be.
Courts have not adopted (and should not adopt) any of the various
totality of the circumstances tests identified in the preceding part. In
many cases, the tests are not considered at all; in others, the tests are
articulated but not applied; and in others, the application is essentially
meaningless. The totality of the circumstances test can hardly be sus-
tained by the rare cases in which the courts have found the existence
of surplus income and then required the satisfaction of other criteria
in order to dismiss a Chapter 7 case for substantial abuse.
VI. ARTICULATING A CLEARER DOCTRINE OF
SUBSTANTIAL ABUSE
A. Policy Concerns and Legislative Goals
This Article argues that the courts have manifestly adopted a doc-
trine which holds that a Chapter 7 case should be dismissed if the
debtor has surplus income sufficient to pay all or a substantial part of
his obligations-or where the debtor has engaged in acts of bad faith
towards the Code. Such a debtor does not deserve the benefit of a
Code designed to "relieve the honest debtor from the weight of op-
pressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the
obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfor-
tunes."'' Courts have not infrequently said that they look for other
factors, but, in reality, almost never do. They often give lip service to
a totality of the circumstances test, but fail to apply it where the
debtor has a surplus amount of income. Where courts consider cir-
cumstances other than income, such consideration is generally in the
lowest jurisdictional courts in the federal system, the bankruptcy
courts, which do not operate uniformly enough to create or apply a
doctrine.
191. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
192. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (quoting Williams v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)).
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The courts' confusing rhetoric works a great disservice to the bank-
ruptcy system. The courts stretch for a test of substantial abuse of the
Code. The abuse may be indicated by motion of the court itself or by
the United States trustee.193 Once the existence of substantial abuse
is properly brought to the court's attention, its actual presence must
be separately decided in each case. Certainly, such a task cannot be
accomplished in a bankruptcy system that in 1997 measured
1,404,145194 cases and is growing in 1998.195 There are not enough
judges and there is not enough time for § 707(b) to be applied on a
"case-by-case" basis. 196
If a substantial abuse test is to become meaningful, it must be ap-
plied in a relatively mechanistic manner, as is most of the remainder
of the Code, 197 and it must be based upon the dominant test of surplus
income. A revised § 707(b) must contain an income test that is pre-
cise and ascertainable. The Code may require a relationship of in-
come to actual expenses or it may, as do some of the bills presented to
Congress, establish a test in accordance with certain established
norms.' 98 The Code will set out the test, but the mechanical form of
presentation should probably be contained in the Official Forms
which determine the essential manner that information is disclosed to
the court. For example, with a precise requirement for the disclosure
of income on the one hand and expenses on the other, the amount
that is not required for basic enjoyment of the fresh start can be ex-
193. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994).
194. In 1984, it was anticipated that § 707 (b) would "make bankruptcy a far less
attractive option for the consumer debtor." Breitowitz, supra note 99, at 329. That
this did not occur may well have been due to the escalating cases and their inappropri-
ate relationship to § 707(b).
195. See Consumer Bankruptcy Reform on the Hill, Bank. L. Letter, May 1998, at 5.
Two 1998 studies, one by SMR Research of Budd Lake, N.J. and the other by Colum-
bia University conclude that the rate of bankruptcy filings will decrease into 1999.
The former study predicts that the actual number of cases will diminish in 1999.
Other studies predict that the rise will continue, perhaps at a lower rate. See Heather
Timmons, Studies Say Refis, High-LTV's Could Cut Bankruptcy in '99, Am. Banker,
Aug. 10. 1998, at 1, 12.
196. "Ultimately, the question of whether or not a substantial abuse exists can only
be determined on a case-by-case basis .... " In re Ploegert, 93 B.R. 641, 642 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1988).
197. The problem with case-by-case determination has appeared in the cases. For
example, one court has commented:
Congress rejected this [mandatory Chapter 13] proposal, at least in part, be-
cause its adoption would have laid an unbearable burden on the bankruptcy
court system as presently constituted. That system depends for its viability
upon the administrative disposition without significant intervention by the
bankruptcy judge, of the great bulk of consumer Chapter 7 cases. To require
that official to review every Chapter 7 case and make the kind of careful
determination required in determining whether a successful Chapter 13 case
could be maintained by the debtor, would call for a great expansion of man-
power, and consequent expense, in the bankruptcy court system.
In re Deaton, 65 B.R. 663, 665 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986).
198. See infra Part VI.B. (discussing H.R. 3150).
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posed. If a substantial abuse is disclosed, a Chapter 7 discharge
should be-and can easily be-denied. 199
The degree by which income exceeds actual or statutorily estab-
lished expenses in order to dismiss the Chapter 7 plan is beyond the
scope of this Article and an issue that is unnecessary to its thrustL2o
The cases have employed a number of different tests when dealing
with actual expenses. Some base their findings upon income sufficient
to fund a Chapter 13 plan covering outstanding obligations in varying
percentages;2° 1 others require payment of "all of her or his creditors
within a reasonable time,""2 2 yet others simply look for the ability to
pay a "meaningful part"'2 3 or "all or a substantial proportion"2" of
outstanding obligations. While the amount of surplus income is, of
course, an important number and consequential to the final legislative
product, this is a computation that can be negotiated in the process of
legislative drafting.
B. Recent Legislation
House Bill 3150, passed by the House of Representatives on Febru-
ary 3, 1998, does not base its determination of substantial abuse upon
the debtor's actual expenses as related to his income. Rather, the fol-
lowing are deducted from the debtor's future monthly income: (i) the
"expense allowances under the applicable National Standards, Local
Standards and Other Necessary Expenses allowance (excluding pay-
ments for debts), issued by the Internal Revenue Service . . . in the
area in which the debtor resides,... (ii) payments on account of se-
cured creditors and... (iii) priority payments.""2 5 If the remainder
199. Chapter 13 and its availability need not be part of this approach. Some cases
have not dismissed a Chapter 7 plan because the debtor is for some reason unavaila-
ble for Chapter 13. See In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Williams, 155
B.R. 773 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993); In re Wegner, 91 B.R. 854 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988);
In re Mastroeni, 56 B.R. 456 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). Whether whatever surplus in-
come may be found is sufficient to fund a Chapter 13 plan is not particularly relevant
to the instant inquiry. It is within the discretion of the debtor, once a Chapter 7 plan
is rejected, whether he wishes to pay expenses outside of bankruptcy or whether he
wishes to enter into Chapter 13. The choice is not imposed by the court and such
issues as whether a mandatory Chapter 13 represents unconstitutional slavery are
inapplicable.
200. Other commentaries on this subject contain pronounced views on what the
test should be. See, e.g., Balser, supra note 150, at 1029 (recommending that the in-
come be sufficient to pay 100% of the obligations within three years).
201. See In re Andrus, 94 B.R. 76, 78 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (discussing cases
where available Chapter 13 plans would cover between 68% and 100% of outstanding
obligations).
202. In re Zaleta, 211 B.R. 178, 181 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1997); see also In re
Barnikow, 211 B.R 176, 177-78 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1997) (accompanying case).
203. In re Struggs, 71 B.R. 96, 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987).
204. In re Ploegert, 93 B.R. 641, 643 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988).
205. H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 101(3) (1998).
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can repay twenty percent or more of unsecured nonpriority claims, the
Chapter 7 plan is dismissed. 0 6
In the Senate version of this bill, passed September 23, 1998,207 a
lesser degree of specificity is required. 0 8 Upon a finding of abuse of
Chapter 7 (no longer substantial abuse as in current law) the court
may either dismiss the case or, without the debtor's consent, move the
case to Chapter 13.2 °9 In deciding whether there is an abuse, the court
shall consider whether the debtor's future income would enable it to
pay thirty percent of the non-priority claims.2 10 Although the thirty
percent test is a clear benefit over the generalities of existing law, I
believe that the Senate bill still contains too much in the way of judi-
cial discretion to be workable in today's bankruptcy regime.
House Bill 3150 also contains an alternate basis for dismissal of a
Chapter 7 case. Even if a debtor's income is insufficient to fund the
twenty percent standard as above, the court will find that there is an
inappropriate use of the provisions of Chapter 7 and the case will be
dismissed if "the totality of the circumstances of the debtor's financial
situation demonstrates such inappropriate use."'211 By retaining the
existing generalized approach that the penalties may be imposed in
the event of abuse of Chapter 7, the Senate version also contains an
alternate basis. 12 As previously noted, these are reasonable alternate
tests.2 13 A second or alternative test basing substantial abuse upon
real bad faith (or a totality of the circumstances) might be appropriate
for cases in which surplus income does not exist but the debtor exhib-
its other affronts against appropriate application of Code relief. These
are truly unusual situations, judgeable on a case-by-case basis, and can
be so handled in the Code without undercutting the essential test-the
existence of surplus income sufficient to pay all or a substantial por-
tion of debtor's outstanding liabilities. The nature of the abuse need
not be defined-as the nature of bad faith is typically not prescribed-
and the standard need not be restrictively applied.1 4
This Article posits that a substantial abuse test of the sort now con-
tained in § 707(b) simply cannot be administered to the excess of
bankruptcies pending in the United States unless it is made more
mechanical. If such a test were established, however, one may well
ask, "What of the abused consumer?" It is impossible to define all
206. See id.
207. See S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1998).
208. See id. § 102.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 103.
212. See S. 1301, 105th Cong. § 102.
213. See supra Part V.B.
214. Applicable circumstances might include, for example, unrestrained spending
before the bankruptcy, living without regard for the limitations of one's income, fraud
in the bankruptcy filing itself, efforts to secrete assets, etc.
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cases with appropriate equity under one umbrella test. It may, there-
fore, be that individual consumers will experience unusual or unex-
pected problems that make dismissal of their Chapter 7 case unfair.
An amended Code should probably contain a provision for the debtor
to introduce some equitable reason-such as the presence of some
dominating personal need-why, even in the face of surplus income,
his Chapter 7 should not be dismissed.215 Such cases undoubtedly
should be handled on a individual basis but it will exemplify the ex-
ception rather than the rule.216
House Bill 3150 does contain such a provision. Section 101's defini-
tion of projected monthly net income contains the concept of "ex-
traordinary circumstances" that can be utilized to adjust the debtor's
surplus income designated for the benefit of unpaid creditors. 17 This
is not the only available approach to the problem, but it does illustrate
one solution.
CONCLUSION
This Article maintains that if a consumer debtor in a Chapter 7 case
has sufficient income to pay all or a substantial part of his creditors
after satisfying his own expenses of living, he should not receive a
Chapter 7 discharge. It is also my position that this viewpoint is sup-
ported by § 707(b) of the Code and has already been adopted by the
United States courts. Courts frequently announce expansions of this
test-such as the additional factors that constitute the "totality of the
circumstances"-that are mere legal window-dressing, and that do not
add to or subtract from the fundamental standard for denial of dis-
charge. Cases truly applying these additional factors are so few and
far between that they do not amount to what can seriously be called a
legal doctrine.
To recognize that a Chapter 7 discharge is unavailable when the
debtor can pay his creditors serves the additional function of putting
Chapters 7 and 13, the two major avenues for debtor bankruptcy re-
lief, and Chapter 11 (a lesser but growing consumer resort)218 into
clearer consistency. While there obviously are differences among the
215. It has been argued that extenuating circumstances of this nature should be
more broadly applied in the Code. According to this argument, a debtor may commit
fraud because of pressing personal needs and the § 523 exemption from discharge
should not be applied. See Luther Zeigler, The Fraud Exception to Discharge in Bank-
ruptcy: A Reappraisal, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 891, 903 (1986).
216. Similarly, undue hardship may make educational loans dischargeable. See 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994).
217. H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 101(4) (1998).
218. See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991) (holding that the Code's plain lan-
guage permits individual debtors not engaged in business to file for relief under Chap-
ter 11); In re Harp, 166 B.R. 740 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993) (holding that post-petition,
pre-confirmation earnings of a debtor who had filed as an individual under Chapter
11 were included in the property of the estate).
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three chapters in various respects (otherwise they would not exist sep-
arately), it is not an acceptable distinction that a debtor with income
should pay creditors under one but retain his income and not pay
under the others. As already noted, present law does not dictate such
a result. The cases reject it under Chapter 7. Under Chapter 11, it is
inequitable for a debtor to retain substantial amounts of income for
the technical reason that it is not included in the bankruptcy estate. 1 9
Under Chapter 13, if a creditor objects to a plan, the creditor must
either be paid in full or it must be demonstrated that the debtor will
apply all of his projected disposable income for three years to pay-
ments under the plan.220 To recognize that a debtor must commit
available income under 7 as well as under 13 simply raises an existing
consistency to the surface.
If the concept is going to be reasonably applied in United States
bankruptcy law, however, it cannot be addressed-as courts profess to
address it today-on a case-by-case basis. There are too many cases
for such an approach. A mechanical test must be created for this pur-
pose. Fortunately, the nature of surplus income and of creditors' obli-
gations indicate that such a test is well within our reach. Indeed,
modern bankruptcy bills do create an approach of this type.
It is further asserted here that a mechanical test that prescribes dis-
missal of a Chapter 7 case in situations where income can be applied
to a substantial part of unsecured obligations is not novel to bank-
ruptcy law. Rather, such a test would clarify and refine the courts'
current approach to Chapter 7 dismissals. Many possible approaches
to the surplus income test exist, some of which appear in recently en-
acted and pending bills. If this review of existing bankruptcy law is
considered and found acceptable, creative minds can join together in a
continuing refinement process so that those who can pay their debts
will assume their social responsibilities.
219. See In re Weber, 209 B.R. 793 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997).
[T]he fact that a debtor's postpetition earnings are not property of the estate
does not mean that the court is precluded from considering those earnings in
connection with a determination of a debtor's good faith in proposing a
plan.... [T]his Court believes that the disposable income test, while it can-
not constitute a bright line for determining good faith in all individual Chap-
ter 11 cases, is useful as a guideline to determine whether a debtor has
committed sufficient available resources to a plan.
Id. at 798-99.
220. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1).
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